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Pamela M. White, “Canada’s regulation of assisted reproduction: morally 
coherent and evidence-based?” Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) By Publication, 




My published body of work submitted for PhD by Publication explores legal, ethical 
and health policy implications for surrogates, gamete donors, and patients of 
Canada’s morally incoherent and misshapen approach to assisted human reproduction 
governance. Modelled on a legislative framework similar to that of the U.K. Human 
Embryology and Fertility Act, 1990 (amended 2008), the passing of Canada’s 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004 was met by relief by policy makers pleased 
to have finally found a workable compromise. However, it was a deeply flawed law. 
As soon as the Act was passed, Quebec launched a constitutional challenge, which 
resulted in the 2010 Supreme Court of Canada decision (Ref re AHR) rendering ultra 
vires the sections of the Act that sought to use federal criminal code powers to 
regulate in areas of provincial constitutional jurisdiction, notably the practice of 
medicine and research. Subsequently, Canada’s assisted human reproduction 
landscape has dissolved into a laissez-faire professionally managed activity. What 
remains of the federal Act is a set of prohibitions criminalising payment of surrogates 
and gamete donors, use of an unscreened and untested ovum obtained from a 
traditional surrogate and used in her own surrogate pregnancy, sex selection, and 
genomic alterations. By 2019, the reimbursement regime for surrogates and gamete 
donors’ expenses and the screening and testing criteria of human ova had yet to be 
regulated by the federal government.  
 
It is against this misshapen and morally incoherent legal backdrop that my work uses 
case studies, empirical interview findings and statistical data analysis of birth and 
assisted reproduction registries to expose unethical fertility treatment practices 
provided to surrogates. I uncover and examine regulatory gaps; for example, when 
surrogates are both ova donors and traditional surrogates. I investigate emerging 
trends in the off-shoring of international surrogacy to Canada and I explore 
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implications for those making embryo disposition decisions when confronted by 
annual cryopreservation storage renewal contracts.   
 
As a body of work my publications have pushed the boundaries of what we know and 
it has revealed important gaps in knowledge (what we do not know) about surrogacy 
and fertility treatments in Canada. My papers bring together for the first time a range 
of data sources, including empirical interviews with IVF patients and descriptive and 
quantitative analysis of treatment data and birth registration information to make a 
significant and innovative methodological contribution to feminist legal studies and 
our understanding of liminal regulatory spaces. Where possible, I strive to give voice 
to the experiences of women and men undergoing fertility treatment.  My published 
output also contributes to an improved and clearer understanding of the ideological 
structures underlying reproductive health information collection systems. This 
landscape reveals a number of thorny dilemmas arising from founding fertility law 
and regulation on misleading and inappropriate information. 
 
Each paper seeks to make an independent original contribution to the literature; but 
together as a body of work, the emergent picture is as follows:  
 
• Canada’s approach of delegating assisted reproductive practices to a laissez-
faire soft-governance regulatory system is a risky business with potential 
harms for patients, including donors and surrogates. Failure to track outcomes 
and a lack of monitoring of adherence to guidelines drives home the need to 
shape law and policy on sound information and empirical findings that give 
voice to the lives lived within the confines of law. To redress this, we need 
better data to foster evidence-based decision making. Efforts thus need to 
made at the provincial and federal levels to develop a transparent and 
accessible assisted reproduction registry compliant with WHO standards. 
Qualitative research with surrogates, intended parents and other actors in the 
fertility treatment industry needs to be undertaken.  A donor registry should 
be established.  
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• From a legal perspective, my work calls for more robust and better tailored 
regulation.  This should involve decriminalisation of financial compensation 
provided to surrogates and gamete donors; the development of policies to 
discourage, if not ban non-resident intended parents; provincial regulation of 
the practice of fertility medicine; and a standardised approach to 
parentageship across all provincial jurisdictions.  
 
 
The published works I am submitting: 
 
1. Chapter 10: ‘A Less Than Perfect Law’: The Unfulfilled Promise of Canada’s 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act’ (2015) in Kirsty Horsey (ed.) Revisiting the 
Regulation of Human Fertilisation and Embryology. London: Routledge 170-184. 
 
2. ‘Moral Evils v. Health and Safety Evils: The Case of an Ovum ‘Obtained’ From a 
‘Donor’ and Used By the ‘Donor’ in Her Own Surrogate Pregnancy’ (2018) 31(2) 
Canadian Journal of Family Law 55-126. 
 
3. ‘Life on the Liminal Bridge Spanning Fertility and Infertility: A Time to Dream 
and a Time to Decide’ (2017) 24 Journal of Law and Medicine 886-899. 
 
4. ‘Hidden from View: Canadian Gestational Surrogacy Practices and Outcomes, 
2001-2012’ (2016) 24 Reproductive Health Matters 205-217. 
 
5.  ‘One for Sorrow, Two for Joy’: American Embryo Transfer Guideline 
Recommendations, Practices, and Outcomes for Gestational Surrogate Patients 
(2017) 34 Journal of Assisted Reproduction and Genetics 432-443. 
 
6. ‘Commercialization, Altruism, Clinical Practice: What Explains Similarities and 
Differences in Californian and Canadian Gestational Surrogacy Outcomes’ 
(2018) 28 Women’s Health Issues 239-250.  
 
7. Chapter 2: ‘‘Why We Don’t Know What We Don’t Know” About Canada’s 
Surrogacy Practices and Outcomes in V. Gruben, A. Cattapan & A. Cameron 
(eds.) Surrogacy in Canada: Critical Perspectives in Law and Policy. (2018), 
Toronto: Irwin Law 51-80. 
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8. ‘Canada’s Surrogacy Landscape is Changing: Should Canadians Care?’ (2017) 39 
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada 1046-1048. 
 
9. Chapter 7: ‘Desperately Seeking Surrogates: Thoughts on Canada’s Emergence 
as an International Surrogacy Destination’ in V. Gruben, A. Cattapan & A. 
Cameron (eds.) Surrogacy in Canada: Critical Perspectives in Law and Policy. 
(2018), Toronto: Irwin Law 213-243. [Co-authored with Karen Busby. Each 
author contributed 50%. [See Annex A].  
 
Annex A: PhD Documentation 
1. Ethics Review Statement and Consent Forms for Eggs and Embryos for 
Research Project. 
2. Co-author statement from Dr. Karen Busby. 
3. Kent Law School Ethics Review. 
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CANADA’S REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: MORALLY 




In my published work submitted here, Canada’s laissez-faire approach to assisted 
human reproductive governance provides a springboard to the investigation of 
specific topics.  Taken together, these articles create a picture of Canada’s misshapen 
and morally incoherent assisted reproductive landscape.  Each published paper is a 
stand-alone article. Yet, four overarching themes emerge from the findings of the 
nine submitted papers:  
i) non-compliance with professional guidelines and a lack of population 
health information contributes to treatment harms for fertility patients, 
including surrogates and egg donors;  
ii) normative notions of ‘fertility and infertility’, ‘the donor’ and ‘the patient’ 
influence decision-making, counselling and guidelines, especially when 
third-party fertility treatments are involved;  
iii) managed ignorance in the establishment of what we know and do not 
know about assisted reproduction practices and outcomes shapes assisted 
reproduction registries and data collection systems and contributes to poor 
policy and law; and  
iv) challenges for governance when the practice of medicine is a provincial 
responsibility but criminal code sanctions are federal responsibilities and 
the practice of fertility medicine is mobile and difficult to contain within 
national boundaries.  
 
My published work does not purport to provide a comprehensive recommended 
solution for Canada’s problematic assisted reproduction governance challenges. In a 
country where the practice of medicine is a provincial constitutional responsibility, 
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the federal government is left with few options.  It has continued to criminalise 
activities viewed as constituting moral or health evils, such as commercialisation of 
surrogacy and gamete donation, sex-selection, cloning and genome alteration. It has 
done little to encourage a pan-Canadian approach to parentage in cases where 
assisted reproductive techniques have been used. Nor have the provinces sought to 
regulate fertility medicine; preferring instead to leave this responsibly to provincial 
professional associations to manage.1  
 
My work offers legal and social policy investigations of harms that can occur for 
patients and to those conceived as a result of assisted reproduction techniques when 
governance is decentralised and left to non-governmental bodies such as professional 
associations.  As a body of work, my publications make a number of 
recommendations for law and policy regarding better data collection and adoption of 
World Health Organization (WHO) standards for Canada’s assisted reproduction 
registry. I call for the establishment of accountability standards. I also join the call for 
provinces to work together to standardise parentage laws and harmonise the 
regulation of fertility medicine. 
 
                                                             
1Ontario. All Families Are Equal Act (Parentage and Related Registrations Statute Law Amendment), 
SO 2016, c 23 requires that parties obtain independent legal advice before entering into a surrogacy 
agreement. Both Ontario and Quebec have placed limits on the number of embryos that should be 
transferred. In 2016, the Ontario Fertility Program funding IVF established that one embryo was to be 
transferred per funded cycle. See online: www.ontario.ca/page/get-fertility-treatments. In Quebec, see 
An Act Respecting Clinical and Research Activities Relating to Assisted Procreation, CQLR c A-5.01, 
s 10.3, which states: “In the course of an in vitro fertilization activity, only one embryo may be 
transferred into a woman. However, in taking account the quality of embryos, a physician may decide 
to transfer two embryos if the woman is 37 years of age or over. This requirement was first put in 
place in 2015 by Bill 20, SQ 2015, c 25, s 3. 
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Historical Overview of Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004 
 
To understand Canada’s assisted human reproduction legislative landscape and the 
harms that I reveal in my work, it is important to chronicle briefly the history of 
Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004 (AHR Act),2 discuss the legacy of 
2010 Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decision (Ref re AHR), identify the 2012 
legislative amendments that I write about in my work, and comment on the 2016-
2019 regulatory AHR Act consultations.3  
 
In formulating its 2004 assisted reproduction legislation, Canada sought to avoid a 
U.S. model of private market fertility medicine4 by adopting a federal criminal code-
based regulatory and governance system stylised on the U.K. Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act (HFE Act) 1990 (amended 2008). The AHR Act 2004 intended 
to regulate the practice and licence IVF clinics. It permitted the use of human 
gametes and embryos in assisted reproduction and the altruistic donation of gametes 
                                                             
2 Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004 c.4. 
3 Health Canada, News Release, "Government of Canada plans to introduce regulations to support the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act" (30 September 2016), online: <www.canada.ca/en/health-
canada/news/2016/09/governmentcanada-plans-introduce-regulations-support-assisted-
humanreproduction- 
act.html>; Canada Gazette, Government Notice, 150:40, "Assisted Human Reproduction Act" (1 
October 2016), online: www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/pl/2016/2016-10-01/html/notice-aviseng.html#ne l; 
Canada Gazette, Proposed Regulations, 152:43, "Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations" at 3637-734; 
Canada Gazette, Proposed Regulations, 152:43, "Reimbursement Related to Assisted Human 
Reproduction Regulations" at 3735-40; Canada Gazette, Proposed Regulations, 152:43, "Regulations 
on the Administration and Enforcement of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act" at 3741-44; Canada 
Gazette, Proposed Regulations, 152:43, "Regulations Amending the Assisted Human Reproduction 
(Section 8 Consent) Regulations" at 3745-51, online: <www.gazette.gc.ca/rppr/pl/2018/2018-10-
27/html/index-eng.html>; Health Canada, Draft Directive: Technical Requirements for Conducting the 
Suitability Assessment of Sperm and Ova Donors, Ottawa: Health Canada, 2018, online: 
www.canada.ca/en/health-Canada/programs/consultationassisted-human-reproduction-
regulations/technical-directive.html#c. 
4 David Snow, “Criminalizing Commercial Surrogacy in Canada and Australia: The Political 
Construction of ‘National Consensus’” (2016) 51 Australian Journal of Political Science 1 at 4. 
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and embryos and surrogacy only when undertaken pursuant to regulation. The Act 
criminalised activities considered to represent moral and health evils such as 
commercial surrogacy and gamete donation, human cloning, genetic germ line 
alteration, embryonic sex selection, and the use of untested and unscreened third-
party human gametes. 
 
Where the Act differed in a fundamental way from its U.K. counterpart was that 
Parliament embedded a series of ethical principles into the legislation. This approach 
is not customary in criminal law5 though other Commonwealth nations have adopted 
a similar tactic.6 Canadian lawmakers intended that a framework of broad-based 
ethical principles of beneficence, social justice (equality), consent, and altruism  
would underpin the practice of assisted reproduction in Canada. 7  These ethical 
principles have remained within the Act notwithstanding the 2010 SCC decision, Ref 
re AHR, and the 2012 amendments made to the Act. My work returns time and again 
to the unfulfilled promise of these ethical principles.  
 
I argue that the prominence given by Parliament to the specification of a set of ethical 
principles could have represented a fundamentally more ambitious and ultimately 
more enduring project than the Act’s identification of prohibited and permitted 
activities.  For example, the statutory focus on autonomy as specified in s.3(a) 
                                                             
5 Glen G. Mitchell, ‘Not a General regulatory Power – A Comment on reference re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act’ (2011) 54 Supreme Court Law Review 633 at 637. 
6 New Zealand. Assisted Human Reproduction Technology Act 2004 No. 92, section 4: Principles; 
Australian State of Victoria Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 No. 76. At section 5: Guiding 
Principles. See also, Benjamin Atkin. “Regulation of assisted Human Reproduction: The Recent New 
Zealand Model in Comparison with Other Systems”2004. Vol.11 RJP/NZACL Yearbook 81-100. 
7 Mitchell (n5) 638. 
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embeds the pillar of free and informed consent into the Act. In regulation (Section 8: 
Consent), permission regarding the use and donation of human reproductive materials 
is a foundational right of the patient. Yet, the amendments made in 2012 to s.10(2)(c) 
of the Act can create regulatory confusion whereby traditional surrogates using IVF 
risk falling into a ‘betwixt and between’ liminal decisional bounded space. Another 
ethical principle at s.3(d) mandates non-discrimination in access to assisted 
reproduction treatments. This equality principle signals the importance of social 
justice for all patients, regardless of marital status, gender or orientation; a condition 
that applies to all patients, including non-Canadian resident intended parents. 
However, the sweeping decision of the SCC in Ref re AHR to render all sections of 
the AHR Act dealing with regulation of health implications of assisted reproduction 
ultra vires leaves the ethical principles of beneficence in a legal liminal state in that 
they are largely unenforceable statements of good intentions. This situation is most 
apparent in the areas of population health surveillance, donor registry, and consumer 
protection as the SCC considered these activities when undertaken by the federal 
government to be constitutionally invalid.  
 
The fatal flaw of Canada’s AHR Act was the grafting of a governance system 
adopted from the U.K. HFE Act 1990 (amended 2008) onto a jurisdiction where 
provinces and not the federal government are responsible for the delivery of 
medicine. Regrettably, the Act’s heavy-handed use of federal powers fed the flames 
of provincial acrimony and set in motion a swift and unwavering legal response on 
the part of the provinces determined to oppose and staunch federal encroachment into 
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areas of provincial constitutional responsibility.8 In 2010, the SCC sided with Quebec 
in its divided decision (4:4:1) Ref re AHR which carefully considered and weighed 
the pith and substance of the Act. The Court concluded that the licencing of IVF 
clinics and governance of fertility medicine were areas that properly fell within 
provincial constitutional jurisdiction. Canada’s senior court thus rendered the 
sections of Act regulating fertility medicine ultra vires.9 The SCC also removed 
federal jurisdiction over measures established as beneficent protections for women 
and children, such as the Personal Health Information Registry, Donor Registry and 
the Agency responsible for oversight and regulation.10   
 
The implications for law and policy of these elements of the SCC decision shape my 
published work and inform my efforts to assess risks created by reliance on soft 
governance and provincial failure to legislate. I examine harms for patients of not 
having a reliable and transparent assisted reproduction registry and I explore 
frustrations for law, regulation and policy of being tasked to develop social 
protections in a knowledge vacuum. It is ironic to note that Canada, by seeking to 
avoid an American style of fertility medicine, lacks the consumer protections that the 
1992 U.S. federal Act achieved.11 Another irony is that, depending on the U.S. state, 
                                                             
8Décret 1177-2004; Décret 73-2006; Attorney General of Quebec v Attorney General of Canada, 2008 
QCCA 1167, [2008]. RJQ 1551, 298 DLR (4th) 712. 
9 2010 SCC 61 [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457. Sections rendered ultra vires: s. 10, 11, 13-18; ss 40(2) (3), (3.1), 
(4) and (5) and ss. 44(2) and (3). 
10 AHR Act s.10, 13-18. 
11 106 Stat. 3146 – Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 
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American surrogates are offered greater health protections than are Canadian-based 
surrogates.12  
 
To complete the brief legislative history, in 2012 the Act was amended to reflect the 
Ref re AHR decision.13 Health Canada was given administrative responsibility for the 
Act including regulation and oversight of testing and screening of human gametes 
used in human reproduction, reimbursement of donors and surrogates, and 
enforcement of prohibited activities.14  It was not until October 2016, that Health 
Canada commenced a consultative initiative designed to address the Act’s regulatory 
deficit.15  In November 2018, Draft Regulations were published with consultation 
extending into March 2019.16 Final Regulations are expected to be placed before 
Parliament for approval later in 2019.  
 
Federal reluctance to regulate combined with a continued reticence by provincial 
authorities to intervene alongside the rise of the unelected notably the heightened role 
                                                             
12 Richard F Storrow, ‘Surrogacy: American Style’ in Paula Gerber and Katie O’Byrne (eds), 
Surrogacy, Law and Human Rights (Routledge 2016) 193.  
13 Readers are invited to read Paper 1 to gain a fuller picture. 
14 Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, SC 2012, c-19, s.714. 
15 Health Canada, News Release, “Government of Canada plans to introduce regulations to support the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (30 Sept 2016), online: < https://www.canada.ca/en/health-
canada/news/2016/09/government-canada-plans-introduce-regulations-support-assisted-human-
reproduction-act.html>; Canada Gazette, Government Notice, 150:40, “Assisted Human Reproduction 
Act” (1 Oct 2016), online: < http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2016/2016-10-01/html/notice-avis-
eng.html#ne1>. 
16 Canada Gazette, Part 1, Volume 152, Number 43. http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2018/2018-10-
27/html/index-eng.html; Draft Directives are found at: https://www.canada.ca/en/health-
canada/programs/consultation-assisted-human-reproduction-regulations/technical-directive.html#c. 
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of assisted reproduction societies and the Canadian Standards Association17 in 
guideline setting, has created a worrisome Canadian assisted reproductive landscape. 
 
 I argue that the 2012 legislative changes and proposed regulations have served to 
make the Act more misshapen and misguided, not less. Canadian constitutional 
realities, government inaction, easy access to cross-border reproduction, and growing 
demand for assisted reproduction treatments has rendered Canada’s AHR Act a 
battered and bruised legislative instrument. My work looks at the harms that 
regulatory inaction can bring to vulnerable groups. I use a number of different 
methodologies to achieve a critical analysis of the implications of Canada’s 
misguided and morally incoherent assisted reproductive Act.   
 
B. SUMMARY OF SUBMITTED PAPERS  
 
This section provides a brief summary of the nine papers submitted for PhD by 
Publication.  The listing of the papers reflects the themes that will be discussed at 
greater length in Parts C and D of this overview document. 
 
B.1 The genesis of Canada’s morally incoherent assisted reproductive law 
 
Paper 1, entitled ‘A Less Than Perfect Law’, chronicles the development of assisted 
human reproductive law and regulation in Canada. Unlike other scholarly work 
discussing the  AHR Act18, my paper examines the ethical principles cited in the Act 
                                                             
17 Canadian Standards Association was contracted by Health Canada to establish assisted reproduction 
guidelines in the absence of regulation. See: Standards Council of Canada, CAN/CSA-Z900-17 
Tissues for Assisted Reproduction, (2017: Standards Council of Canada). 
18 Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004, c.4. 
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and maps them against Canada’s reproductive regulatory and governance regime.  
The paper examines the impact of the SCC decision in Ref re AHR19 and expands on 
the policy frameworks that have influenced legislative change since the 2010 SCC 
decision. The paper is an important building block and forms the foundation for the 
remaining eight papers for it reminds us of Parliament’s intentions to embed ethical 
principles of non-maleficence, autonomy, equality and non-discrimination into the 
practice and governance of assistance reproduction in Canada.20 It underscores that 
federal law in the area of health, which is a provincial constitutional matter, is 
restricted and confined to the control of moral and health evils: the pith and substance 
of the Act.  
 
B.2 Liminal regulatory spaces 
Paper 2, ‘Moral Evil v Health Evil’, focuses on changes made to section 10(1) of the 
Act. In this amendment, the federal government seeks to reduce harm to human 
health and safety arising from use of human sperm or ova, including the risk of 
disease transmission.  The legislation now mandates screening and testing of 
"obtained" ovum "donated" by a "donor" and used in her own surrogate pregnancy. 
The paper argues that this change creates a dangerous liminal regulatory space; one 
that transforms the surrogate into a third-party donor even though she incurs no 
health and safety risk to herself as she is the recipient of her own ova embryo. 
Screening for genetic implications that could have health consequences for the 
surrogate-born child makes a stronger case in support of mandatory testing, however 
                                                             
19 2010 SCC 61 [2010] 3 SCR 457. 
20 AHR Act s.3. 
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the amendment imposes no similar screening and testing regime on the usual 
category of traditional surrogates: women who bear genetically-related children 
conceived through artificial insemination (IUI) rather than IVF. The paper questions 
the application of federal criminal code powers to control what I conclude is a non-
existent health and safety evil.  It argues that the actual evil is a moral one whereby 
criminal code sanctions are being employed to discourage traditional surrogacy when 
practiced as a result of assisted reproduction techniques.  
 
Picking up on a different kind of harm experienced by those who negotiate Canada’s 
complex regulatory landscape, Paper 3, ‘Liminal Bridge’ examines embryo 
cryopreservation, a technique frequently viewed as providing IVF patients with a 
reassuring fertility insurance benefit. However, as the paper argues, this 
characterization fails to encompass the field of dreams that frozen embryo storage 
and retention create for many infertile couples and individuals. The article uses 
qualitative interview data from 45 Canadian fertility treatment patients, the majority 
of whom were interviewed by the author in 2013-14, to explore how liminal spatial 
and temporal reproductive boundaries were negotiated by patients as they made 
decisions about their stored embryos. It sheds light on the investments made by 
patients in “hope technologies”, examines the destabilisation and category mixing 
that fertility preservation can generate, and investigates the liminal places in which 
patients and their stored embryos dwell and experience time. Canada imposes no 
embryo storage retention time limits. This article argues that to do so would confuse 
notions of embryo storage time with that of reproductive purpose which could lead to 
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further ambiguity and liminality. It contributes to the existing literature on the topic 
by examining how annual private-sector storage renewal contracts, Canada’s Section 
8 (Consent) Regulations,21 and liminal notions of (in)fertility challenge patients’ 
abilities to make storage, use and disposition decisions.  
 
B.3 ‘Why we don’t know what we don’t know’:  Implications of soft governance  
Paper 4, ‘Hidden from View’, brings together for the first time a synthesis of 
information about surrogacy in Canada. This paper raises some troubling questions 
about the fertility treatments provided to Canadian gestational surrogates.  Using 
information that I obtained from Canada’s Assisted Reproduction Registry (CARTR 
Plus), it traces the growing incidence of multiple births experienced by Canadian 
gestational surrogates over the period 2003 to 2012. Among the findings, the paper 
shows that by 2012, one-quarter of gestational surrogates received a single embryo 
transfer compared to almost one-half of other IVF patients. This is a worrisome 
situation given the known health implications of multi-fetal pregnancies. The paper 
recommends that greater attention needs to be paid to counselling provided to 
gestational surrogates and that review of the 2007 Canadian Medical Association22 
surrogate treatment guidelines is warranted. Finally, the paper describes the 
difficulties in obtaining accurate data about Canadian assisted reproductive medicine 
practices. Without public access to information, it is difficult to identify potentially 
harmful practices.  
                                                             
21 Section 8 (Consent) Regulations SOR/2007-137. 
22 Daniel R. Reilly, ‘Surrogate pregnancy: A guide for Canadian prenatal health care providers’ (2007) 
176 (4) Canadian Medical Association Journal 483. 
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‘One for Sorrow, Two for Joy’ (Paper 5) profiles the case of Melissa Cook, a 
California gestational surrogate experiencing a multiple-birth pregnancy following 
the IVF transfer of three embryos comprised of donor eggs and sperm provided by 
the intended father, to explore troubling issues about fertility treatment practices 
involving gestational surrogates, twin preference and third-party reproduction 
medical decision-making. It focuses on multiple-embryo transfers and offers an 
original analysis of data I obtained from the U.S. national-assisted reproduction 
registry maintained by U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). It 
undertakes a review of American Society for Reproductive Medicine–Society for 
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ASRM-SART) embryo transfer guidelines 
(1998-2016). It examines single and multiple-embryo transfer trends over a 12-year 
period (2003 to 2014) and compares results to the recommended guidelines. Findings 
reveal that guidelines were followed in fewer than four out of ten embryo transfers. 
The paper argues that ensuring equitable medical treatment for all recipients of IVF 
requires the adoption of treatment guidelines tailored to and offering protections for 
specific patient groups.  Once in place, guidelines must be robustly implemented. The 
paper lays the ground-work for study examining adherence to Canadian embryo 
transfer guidelines, a set of soft-governance practices modeled on the U.S. approach.  
 
Paper 6, ‘Commercialization, Altruism, and Clinical Practice’ documents the 
increase in surrogate births occurring in California and Canada. It details how, over 
the five (5) years from 2010 to 2014, the number of babies born to gestational 
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surrogates having IVF treatment in California doubled. In Canada, it grew by over a 
third. Adherence to voluntary ASRM-SART and Canadian Fertility and Andrology 
Society (CFAS) embryo transfer guidelines was modelled.  The paper found that 
embryo transfer guideline adherence over the period was 42% in California and 48% 
in Canada.  The paper concludes that, regardless of where on the 
commercial/noncommercial boundary North American surrogates reside, they are 
more likely to receive more donor ova embryos per IVF transfer than other patients. 
The paper suggests that the altruistic desire to assist childless couples and individuals 
create families, along with clinic practices encouraging multiple embryo transfers, 
appear to play major roles in treatment decision-making. The paper recommends 
more research into third-party reproduction consenting mechanisms.  
 
‘Why We Don’t Know’ (Paper 7) traces my journey to uncover what we know and do 
not know about surrogacy and fertility medicine practices and outcomes in Canada. 
Over the past several years I have searched broadly and tirelessly to find data on 
assisted reproduction practices and outcomes.  In this paper, I explore a number of 
reasons that may explain this difficult situation. Specifically, it asks: ‘Why don’t we 
know what we don’t know?’ I query why is has been so difficult to obtain reliable 
and consistent information about assisted reproduction and the practice of surrogacy. 
I seek to understand whether there is something unique about fertility medicine — 
and, in particular, surrogacy — that belies rigorous measurement and information-
based decision making. In attempting to answer these questions, I examine how the 
strategic management of information shapes what we know and don’t know about 
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surrogacy.  I look at how IVF clinic practices influence decisions about the data that 
are collected. I assess the implications of not knowing about fertility outcomes for 
patients, policy, and law. I recommend that there needs be an opportunity for 
surrogates, children, intended parents, counsellors, and clinicians to provide input 
into research and data collection frameworks. I advise that discussions about 
remaking Canada’s surrogacy law and regulations must give priority to consideration 
of assisted reproduction information systems including determination of who gets to 
set what we know and how we know about assisted reproduction patients, including 
surrogates.  
 
B.4 Borderless fertility medicine: Implications for Canadian law, policy and 
patients  
It appears, based on my findings, that the number of ‘surrogacy tourists’ choosing 
Canada as their destination for treatment is growing rapidly.  Paper 8, ‘Canada’s 
Surrogacy Landscape is Changing’ provides a commentary on the growth of 
surrogacy in Canada, notably the increase in non-Canadian resident intended parents.  
It shows that over a third of surrogate babies were born to non-Canadian residents, a 
pattern mimicking that of California, a jurisdiction privileging paid surrogacy. The 
paper asks a number of questions about legal and policy problems that this trend may 
create for Canada. It recommends that more attention be paid to this emergent 
phenomenon.  
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Finally, Paper 9, ‘Desperately Seeking Surrogates’ is a legal and social policy 
response to the questions asked in Paper 8.  It is my sole co-authored paper (with Dr. 
Karen Busby).  It explores why Canada is emerging as an international surrogacy 
destination and asks whether Canadians should be concerned about this development. 
Returning to focus explicitly on the ethical principles considered at the outset of my 
work, it examines whether concerns about consent, distributive justice, exploitation, 
and commodification raised about reproductive medicine practices in the Global 
South apply now that Canada has emerged as a site attracting international fertility 
patients. It then explores whether there are other reasons for Canadians to feel uneasy 
about international intended parents seeking surrogates in Canada, which leads into a 
discussion on whether Canada should introduce residency restrictions on surrogacy. 
It closes by noting research gaps and suggests that Canadian lawmakers consider pro-
hibiting international surrogacy in Canada or, at least, level the playing field between 
international and local intended parents by permitting surrogates to be compensated 
by Canadian intended parents. 
 
With a brief summary of each paper having been provided, the next section of this 
overview document will elaborate on the methods employed and expound on the 
theoretical concepts used in the papers. Major contributions to the area of medical 
ethics and legal studies will be discussed and key findings along with 
recommendations will be presented in subsequent sections. 
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C. RESEARCH METHODLOGIES  
This section of the Overview document aims to provide an explanation of and a 
detailed focus on the more innovative methodologies in evidence in my published 
peer-reviewed work.  This section can be divided in to two sub-sections: 1) 
Quantitative analysis of assisted reproduction registry information; and 2) Qualitative 
interview analysis.  
 
C.1 Quantitative analysis of assisted human reproduction registries  
As has been discussed, one consequence of the SCC decision Ref re AHR was the 
removal of federal jurisdiction over collection of population health information 
pertaining to fertility treatments and outcomes for patients. Canadian IVF Directors 
and the CFAS manage Canada’s sole registry on assisted reproduction: CARTR Plus. 
The provinces of Ontario and British Columbia have recognized parentage related to 
assisted reproduction births and hold data on births to surrogates.  
 
In my work, I have accessed and analysed these sources of Canadian information as 
well as U.S. assisted reproduction information collected by the CDC and held in their 
national assisted reproduction registry, National Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Surveillance System (NASS).  I requested tabular data for the periods 2001-2014 
pertaining to embryo transfer cycles for surrogates and non-surrogates. I undertook 
descriptive cohort and trend analysis. I compared statistical risks of multiple embryo 
transfers using accepted methods (risk ratio analysis).  The details of these analyses 
are explained in my publications (Papers 4 - 8).  
  21 
 
My use of assisted reproduction registry data and vital statistics birth registrations 
signals an innovative approach in the field of feminist legal studies in that my 
published work examines not only the outcomes of fertility medicine but also how 
treatment knowledge is managed and developed by soft-governance bodies. In my 
work, I have extended theoretical thinking advanced by Proctor23 and Schiebinger24 
regarding the management of ignorance. Using my extensive knowledge of data 
development techniques, I examine the structure of these data repositories.25 I argue 
in Paper 7 that assisted reproduction registries do not employ a ‘neutral’ 
classification system or use a patient-centered framework. In Canada and the U.S., 
such registries reflect technologies of medicalisation and bio-power.26 The manner in 
which treatment data are structured normalises patient/doctor relations, privileges 
treatment options, defines and shape the characteristics of reproductive bodies.27  
 
For example, it is convenient for fertility clinics to organize patient encounters by 
IVF cycle given that procedure billing and medical treatments usually occur on a 
per–IVF cycle basis. Yet, the term “IVF cycles” means very little to the general 
                                                             
23 Robert N Proctor, Cancer Wars: How Politics Shapes What We Know and Don’t Know about 
Cancer (Basic Books 1995). 
24 Londa Schiebinger, ‘Agnotology and Exotic Abortifacients: The Cultural Production of Ignorance in 
the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World’ (2005) 149:3 Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society 316; See also: Steven Hilgartner, ‘Selective Flows of Knowledge in Technoscientific 
Interaction: Information Control in Genome Research’ (2012) 45:2 British Journal for the History of 
Science 267; Jennifer L Croissant, ‘Agnotology: Ignorance and Absence or Towards a Sociology of 
Things That Aren’t There’ (2014) 28:1 Social Epistemology 4. 
25 I worked for over 25 years as a senior official at Statistics Canada developing and analysing 
demographic and census databases. 
26 Michael Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selective Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. Colin 
Gordon (ed) (Patheon 1980); Peter Conrad, The Medicalization of Society: On the Transformation of 
Human Conditions into Treatable Disorders (Johns Hopkins University Press 2007).  
27 Alan Hyde, Bodies of Law. (1997) (Princeton University Press 1997) at 76-78.  
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public or the newly initiated IVF patient. Using the IVF cycle as the unit of 
observation focuses attention on results achieved by embryo rather than on the 
outcomes for the patient, client, or surrogate. For the embryologist studying success 
rates and examining differing techniques, the focus is appropriate. However, such a 
categorization system renders analysis at the level of the patient difficult, as each 
patient frequently experiences multiple cycles of IVF transfer or ovarian stimulation. 
Further complicating the analysis for surrogates is that the surrogate is not classified 
as being the patient. Rather, the term patient is reserved for the intended parent as 
they are the party with the infertility problems as well as being the fee-paying 
client.28  
 
The consequence of this structuring of knowledge is that the information being 
collected about surrogate encounters with IVF clinic treatment overwhelmingly 
concerns the outcome for the intended parent as the data relating to the surrogate lists 
the embryo transfers, condition of the embryo, its origin (own embryo meaning the 
intended mother’s embryo) and stage of development. In a surrogate IVF cycle, the 
number of fetal pregnancies and births outcome per transfer will be recorded.  But no 
information is obtained about the surrogate’s socio-economic background, parity 
(number of previous births and pregnancies including surrogate ones) or her 
pregnancy and birthing experiences. This approach denies the surrogate a role in 
reproduction. It makes assessment of appropriate treatment for surrogates difficult 
and renders monitoring of adherence to guidelines extremely challenging to 
                                                             
28 Kiran M Perkins et al. ‘Trends and Outcomes of Gestational Surrogacy in the United States’ (2016) 
106:2 Fertility and Sterility 435. 
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undertake for surrogates and ova donors as in both instances they are not defined as 
patients in assisted reproduction registries.  
 
In Canada, there is little opportunity to effect change to fertility treatment data 
collection systems as there is no population health agency providing oversight or 
accountability. The collection and organization of fertility health information is a 
private-medicine endeavor managed and funded by the CFAS and the IVF clinic 
directors. These parties are not transparent in the publication of assisted reproduction 
treatment information. Nor are they forthcoming about the management of the 
registry. My access to the data held in CARTR Plus was approved by the IVF 
Directors who adjudicate the ethical and scientific value of proposed studies.  My 
applications were all approved apart from the most recent when I was refused access 
to the data on multiple embryo transfers to same-sex couples. A recent qualitative 
interview study suggests that same-sex male couples prefer to have a twin surrogate 
birth.29  I sought to validate this finding using national data, but was refused the data 
on surrogate embryo transfers for same-sex intended parents. Without access to this 
information, it is not possible to monitor trends in twin preference for this group and 
other types of intended parents. 
 
                                                             
29 Sophia Fantus, The Path to Parenthood isn’t Always Straight: A Qualitative Exploration of the 
Experiences of Gestational Surrogacy for Gay Men in Canada – Perspectives of Gay Fathers and 
Surrogates. A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy Factor-Inwentash Faculty of Social Work Joint Centre for Bioethics University of Toronto. 
2017. 
https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/80680/1/Fantus_Sophia_201711_PhD_thesis.pdf  
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It is unfortunate that one of the consequences of Canada’s desire to avoid what Snow 
has characterized as the pitfalls of the U.S. private medicine model resulted in 
Canada closing the door on a consumer protection approach, like the one adopted by 
the U.S.30  In 1992, the U.S. passed legislation requiring all IVF clinics to transmit 
IVF clinic data to the CDC.31 In retrospect, the American approach, which involves a 
unique public-private partnership between the CDC and the professional associations 
of the ASRM-SART might have been a more appropriate registry model for Canada. 
Indeed, similar arrangements between federal/provincial governments and 
institutions/ businesses exist in other data collection contexts in Canada including, 
cancer, vital statistics, education data and policing.32 Had Canada adopted a similar 
model, a public health organization such as Statistics Canada or the Canadian 
Institute for Health Information (CIHI) could have managed the population health 
elements of an assisted reproduction registry for Canada.33  
 
Under this model of data governance, Canada would have had a national data registry 
founded on data accuracy and transparency.  There would also have been an 
opportunity to update registry elements to better measure changing fertility treatment 
advancements. It would have also provided needed public information about fertility 
                                                             
30 Snow (n4) at 4. 
31 106 Stat. 3146 – Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992.  
32 See the Statistics Canada data holdings at www.statcan.gc.ca. The Canadian Cancer Registry (CCR) 
for example is described as a population-based registry that includes data collected and reported to 
Statistics Canada by each provincial/territorial cancer registry (PTCR). The person based CCR collects 
information about each new primary cancer diagnosed among Canadian residents since 1992. The 
objective is to produce standardized and comparable incidence data that can be used to assist and 
support health planners and decision-makers to: identify risk factors; plan, monitor and evaluate 
cancer screening, treatment and control programs; and conduct research at: 
http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&amp;SDDS=3207.  
33 Canadian Institute for Health Information at: https://www.cihi.ca/en  
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medicine and provided a measure of consumer protection and awareness.  Failure to 
foresee the consequences of leaving assisted reproduction data governance to the IVF 
clinics directors must cause us to question the fulfillment of the ethical principle of 
beneficence specified in the AHR Act. This omission is acutely highlighted by the 
lack of a donor registry and failure to put limits on the number of children that can 
conceived using a single third-party donor.   
 
Investigation of the form and function of assisted reproduction registries has 
influenced me to look at international data collection system protocols overseen by 
the WHO, notably the International Classification Management of Assisted 
Reproduction Technology (ICMART).34  For example, the Canadian registry, 
CARTR Plus does not collect all of the ICMART required elements. As well, I argue 
that insufficient examination of the structuring of assisted reproduction registries has 
occurred with the result that ‘what we know and do not know’ about the practices and 
outcomes of fertility medicine has shaped our development of law and policy in 
unforeseen ways. In this manner, both reproductive knowledge and ignorance are 
being managed.  I suggest that this is an area demanding renewed research focus and 
application of a patient-centred vision to the collection and management of assisted 
reproduction data. 
 
                                                             
34 For a detailed description of ICMART see Paper 7 at 62-64. 
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Once I had come to understand how it was that so little information was available 
about surrogates, I asked the question: What would happen if the paradigm of the 
assisted reproduction registry was inverted so that the surrogate was classified not as 
a treatment option but as patient? For example, would it be possible to step outside of 
the ontology of the fertility clinic concept of treatment success and the science of 
embryology?  If I could accomplish this task, I should be able to shed light on 
outcomes, best practices, and adherence to soft governance guidelines. In taking this 
perspective, I chose to investigate whether surrogates received similar fertility 
treatments and whether there has been an uneven application of recommended 
treatment guidelines. I expected that this line of enquiry would give recognition to 
the duty of care and beneficent treatment owed to her.35 
 
My attempts to situate the surrogate as the patient relied on the data I was able to 
obtain on request from the CDC NASS and Canada’s CARTR Plus registries.  I made 
requests for data from the CDC over the 2003 to 2015 period.36 I made similar 
requests over the same time period for information from the Canada’s assisted 
reproduction technology registry (CARTR Plus) though obtaining data from this 
source proved to be difficult and administratively onerous.37  Regarding Canadian 
birth registration data, I was able to obtain this information using access to 
information requests made to the British Columbia and Ontario vital statistics 
                                                             
35 Jason Min and Camille Silvestre, Guidelines on the Number of Embryos to Transfer (Canadian 
Fertility and Andrology Society 2013).  
36 Budgetary restrictions imposed by the Trump administration on the CDC has meant that staff have 
left the organisation and my most recent data request remains unanswered as the database has not been 
updated. Email exchanges between CDC and P. White 10 December 2018.  
37 Data requests covered the 2003-2015 period for both Canada and the United States. I requested the  
same datasets from both CDC and CARTR Plus. 
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organisations. I obtained ethics review permission from University of Kent Law 
School for all of the requested data retrievals.   
 
In my work, I have been able to compare surrogate and non-surrogate IVF embryo 
transfer patterns and model compliance against recommended embryo transfer 
guidelines. I undertook an exhaustive analysis of the embryo transfer guidelines 
development process in both jurisdictions (Papers 5 and 6). To assess compliance to 
the embryo transfer guidelines, I applied the statistical Risk Ratio technique to the 
data obtained from CDC and Canada’s IVF directors.38  I demonstrated that 
surrogates have a greater statistical risk than other IVF patients of receiving two or 
more embryos per transfer. This is a worrisome finding given the known health risks 
to pregnant women and babies of a multi-fetal pregnancy.39 Difference in multiple 
embryo transfer risk is especially pronounced when donor ovum embryos are used, a 
practice that dominates surrogacy treatments.40 My findings show that in the United 
States and Canada, recommended embryo transfer guidelines are more likely to be 
followed when the patient is not a surrogate and when she uses her own ovum 
embryos.  
 
                                                             
38 Perkins (n28).  
39 MacKay AP, Berg JC, King JC, Duran C and Chang J., ‘Pregnancy related mortality among women 
with multifetal pregnancies’ (2006) 107 Obstetrics and Gynecology. 563; A. Sazonova et al., 
‘Neonatal and maternal outcomes comparing women undergoing two in vitro fertilization (IVF) 
singleton pregnancies and women undergoing one IVF twin pregnancy’ (2013) 99 Fertility and 
Sterility 731.  
40 Donor ovum embryos come from a third-party ova donor.  Own-use ovum embryos come from the 
intended mother.  
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My work causes us to ask a number of difficult questions about the duty of care 
provided to surrogates. It questions the ability of surrogates to engage in meaningful 
consent in a multi-party reproductive situation. It reveals the importance and 
influence on treatment decisions of factors such as twin preference, high fertility 
treatment costs and the overwhelming desire on the part of all parties to achieve a 
pregnancy. Yet, information about these considerations is not to be found in existing 
treatment registries.  It is only through in-depth surrogate-focused qualitative 
research that insights will be gained about the factors influencing treatment decision-
making.  
 
To summarize, the use of quantitative statistical techniques is infrequently 
undertaken in legal studies though this approach is becoming more common in 
bioethics.41  My published work in Papers 4 - 7 demonstrate the value of this 
approach especially when regulatory mechanisms are weak or left to the unelected to 
establish and monitor. My work also shows the value of multi-national comparisons.  
I also challenge a number of assumptions about the harms caused by commercial 
surrogacy. Commercialization of surrogacy has been viewed as an exploitative form 
of assisted reproduction.42  My findings support a position that the lack of adherence 
to guidelines, data systems masking surrogates’ encounters with the fertility industry, 
                                                             
41 Jeremy Sugarman and Daniel P. Sulmasy, Methods in Medical Ethics. (Georgetown University 
Press 2010). See chapter 2: Jeremy Sugarman, Ruth Faden and Alison Boyce, ‘A quarter century of 
empirical research in Biomedical ethics’ 21 at 24-25; Chapter 12, Robert A Pearlman and Helene E. 
Starks, ‘Quantitative Surveys’ 233.  
42Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation (Princeton University Press 1996) Chapter 4; Julie Shapiro, ‘For a 
Feminist Considering Surrogacy, Is Compensation Really the Key Question?’ (2014) 89 Washington 
Law Review 1345; Jenni Millbank, “Rethinking ‘Commercial’ Surrogacy in Australia” (2015) 12 
Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 477. 
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multi-party consenting, and an absence of documentation about surrogate treatments 
and pregnancy outcomes can reveal potentially exploitative situations. My work 
illustrates that these potentially exploitative elements operate regardless of the 
commercial/non-commercial environment in which surrogacy operates. I argue that 
this area of research and enquiry merits additional theoretical and research attention 
by feminist legal scholars.  
 
C.2 Qualitative Research Methodology  
Paper 3 is founded on a qualitative research methodology. As a Research Associate 
for the Canadian Institute for Health Research funded project, Eggs and Embryos for 
Research,43 I was a member of a research team investigating embryo 
cryopreservation and disposition decisions made by women and men recruited from 
three Canadian IVF clinics. Research Ethics Board approval for the study, including 
use of the interview materials in my PhD, was obtained from the IWK Research 
Ethics Board for the Halifax and Ottawa sites, and from the Montreal Hospital 
Research Ethics Board for the Montreal site.44 The Kent Law School Ethics Review 
permitted the use of the findings in published papers submitted as requirement for a 
PhD by publication and the Principle Investigator, Dr. François Baylis, of the Eggs 
and Embryos for Research Project gave me permission to author an independent 
publication.   
                                                             
43Dr. Françoise Baylis was the PI for this project. See Annex for the Ethics Approval for the project. 
44 Canadian Health Research Institute funded Eggs and Embryos for Research Project, 2011-2014 
(#EOG-111389). The Kent Law School Ethics Review approval enabled the study of CDC and 
Canadian assisted reproduction registries, vital statistics birth registration data, and discussions with 
custodians of these datasets to be undertaken and the results used in peer-reviewed publications.  
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In this project, I adapted the interview questionnaire that had been developed by 
Professor Erica Haimes for her U.K. work on Egg Donation and Sharing45 to create a 
semi-structured interview survey instrument. As part of the interview team, I 
conducted interviews and undertook analysis of the transcripts. In the context of my 
own work (Paper 3), I developed a discursive constant comparison thematic 
technique that I used to examine interview transcript materials.46 I took sole 
responsibility for the analysis, writing and publication preparation of Paper 3. My 
findings revealed liminal thresholds that patients said they needed to cross as a result 
of retaining gametes and embryos and making decisions about their use, retention and 
disposition. The theoretical and legal policy importance of my findings is discussed 
at greater length in the section of this document dealing with liminal decisional 
regulatory spaces.  
 
Empirical research is becoming more common among scholars examining law and 
policy through the eyes of those for whom the legislation is intended to impact.47 My 
                                                             
45 Erica Haimes & Ken Taylor, ‘Fresh Embryo Donation for Human Embryonic Stem Cell (hESC) 
Research: The Experiences and Values of IVF Couples Asked to be Embryo Donors’ (2009) 24(9) 
Human Reproduction 2142. Dr Haimes was a study member.  
46 Daniel Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data (SAGE, 4th ed, 2011); Steven Timmermans and 
Ian Tavory, ‘Theory Construction in Qualitative Research: From Grounded Theory to Abductive’ 
(2012) 30(3) Sociological Theory 167. See Paper 3 for a description of this technique and an 
explanation of how it was used.  
47 See for example: Jenni Millbank et al, ‘Embryo Donation for Reproductive Use in Australia’ (2013) 
20 Journal of Law and Medicine 789 at 802; Erica Chandler et al, ‘Rethinking Consent, Information-
Giving and Counselling Concerning Stored Embryos within IVF Treatment’ (2013) 20 Journal of Law 
and Medicine 759; Isabel Karpin et al, ‘Analysing IVF Participant Understanding of, Involvement on 
and Control over Storage and Destruction in Australia’ (2013) 20 Journal of Law and Medicine 811; 
Anna Stuhmcke, ‘Tick Tock Goes the Clock: Rethinking Policy and Embryo Storage Limits’ (2014) 
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work in Paper 3 draws on hermeneutics, a methodology for dealing with 
uncertainty.48 This theoretical approach is especially useful in the examination of 
liminal states and decision-making.49 When combined with the tools of qualitative 
semi-structured interviewing, the approach is a powerful instrument designed to 
investigate how individuals engage with law and regulation.  A central feature of my 
work is the impact of law and regulation on the health of women and families. The 
specific twist in the Canadian context is that soft governance mechanisms have 
replaced regulation, with implications going unnoticed and under-assessed.  
 
I argue in my work that qualitative data analysis allows the researcher privileged 
understandings. It surfaces new evidence about relationships between gendered 
harms, legislation and regulatory regimes. The analysis of the implications of 
Canada’s misguided law through the employment of qualitative data methodology 
brings new insights to feminist legal studies especially about the manner in which 
law shapes lives and fosters reproductive harm through the imposition of contractual 
deadlines. The qualitative research methodologies that I employ in Paper 3 supports 
the analytical work on liminal regulatory spaces advanced by Laurie50 and developed 
by Squier51 in areas of health care.  My use of the concept of liminality to understand 
                                                             
22 Feminist Legal Studies 285; S Takahasi et al, ‘Decision Making Process for the Future of Frozen 
Embryos by Japanese Infertile Women: A Qualitative Study’ (2012) 13 Medical Ethics 9. 
48 Diego Gracia, ‘Philosophy: Ancient and contemporary approaches’ in Jeremy Sugarman and Daniel 
P. Sulmasy (eds) Methods in Medical Ethics. (Georgetown University Press 2010) 55 at 62-64. 
49 Haimes and Taylor (n45). 
50 Graeme Laurie. ‘Liminality and the Limits of Law in Health Research Regulation: What Are We 
Missing in the Spaces In-Between?’ (2017) 25(1) Medical Law Review 47. 
51 Susan Merrill Squier. Liminal Lives: Imaging the Human at the Frontiers of Biomedicine. (Duke 
University Press 2004). 
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the creation and maintenance of liminal legal spaces is discussed in the next section 
of this overview document. 
 
D. Key Themes 
 
My work explores three key themes flowing from Canada’s misguided and 
incoherent assisted reproduction law and policy: the creation of socially and legally 
constructed liminal spaces; problems arising from cross-border surrogacy and the 
manner in which Canadian law and policy enables it to occur; and ‘not knowing’ – a 
theme examined in the section on Methodology (C.1) and which I briefly expand on 
its significance for legal scholars in section D.3.  
 
D. 1: Lives lived in ambiguous liminal legal space: Betwixt and between 
(in)fertility 
  
Liminality is a construct advanced recently by legal scholars52, bioethicists53 and 
social historians.54 I use two different reproductive situations to explore and critically 
assess the concept of liminality and its theoretical usefulness: (i) retention of human 
embryos; and (ii) traditional surrogacy as defined by s.10(2)(c) of the AHR Act.   
 
                                                             
52Graeme Laurie and Emily Postan. ‘Rhetoric or Reality: What is the Legal Status of the Consent 
From in Health-related research’ (2013) 21 (3) Medical Law Review 371; Agomoni Ganguli Mitra, 
Edward S. Dove, Graeme Laurie, and Samuel Taylor-Alexander, 'Reconfiguring social value in health 
research through the lens of liminality ', (2017) Bioethics, 87.  
53 Helen Allen, ‘Experiences of Infertility: Liminality and the Role of the Fertility Clinic’ (2007) 14(2) 
Nursing Inquiry 132 
54 Benjamin Thomassen, ‘The Uses and Meanings of Liminality’ (2009) 2(1) International Political 
Anthropology 5.  
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Turner55 pioneered the concept of liminality in the field of cultural anthropology. He 
used it to examine important life changes and to identify situations where individuals 
transitioned from one state of belonging to another. He argued that during the process 
of transition one existed in a betwixt and between state. More recently scholars have 
come to recognize that the concept of liminality also characterizes transitions 
occurring between illness and health.56 Liminality has been applied to processes of 
migration and settlement, notably to refugees and homeless individuals.57 In the 
context of health research, Laurie has applied the concept to the process of obtaining 
consent from clinical research participants. He argues that consent to clinical research 
by persons exhibiting the disease for which the treatments are being trialed effects a 
liminal legal space whereby the consenting process becomes blurred and 
intermediary as participants exist in a between and betwixt status and transition 
between patient to research subject statuses.58  
 
In my work, I advance the work of Squier who observes that biomedical 
developments enable the patient to transition from illness and pass into a new and 
changed health status. I examine how embryo cryopreservation reshapes the form, 
                                                             
55 A Van Gennep, Rites of Passage (Chicago University Press, 1960); Victor Turner, The Ritual 
Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Routledge, 1969).  
56 Evelyn Blows et al, ‘Liminality as a Framework for Understanding the Experience of Cancer 
Survivorship: A Literature Review’ (2012) 68(10) Journal of Advanced Nursing 2155; Lorne Granek 
and Kenneth Fergus, ‘Resistance, Agency and Liminality in Women’s Accounts of Symptom 
Appraisal and Help-Seeking Upon Discovery of a Breast Irregularity’ (2012) 75 Social Science and 
Medicine 1753; Samuel Tierney et al, ‘Liminality and Transfer to Adult Services: A Qualitative 
Investigation Involving Young People with Cystic Fibrosis’ (2013) 50(3) International Journal of 
Nursing Studies 738. Ronald L Grimes, Rite Out of Place: Ritual, Media and the Arts (Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
57 Edward W Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places 
(Blackwell, 1996). 
58 Laurie (n50). 
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extent, and limits of human life course possibilities by enabling a transition from a 
biological limitation, like infertility, to a state whereby biological constraints become 
reshaped and redefined by fertility enabling technology.59   
 
Liminality as a theoretical construct has been especially useful as it permits legal 
scholars to identify and examine legal ambiguity. Using the lived experienced of 
women and men who store frozen embryos, I reveal in Paper 3 how embryo 
cryopreservation reshapes the limitation of (in)fertility and in so doing creates an 
unstable and temporary fertility. The need to make decisions about the reproductive 
use of frozen embryos, continued storage, donation to research, or disposition 
revealed the destabilizing and shifting grounds produced by fertility medicine. It 
exposed a liminal bridge between (in)fertility and fertility that patients needed to 
cross when taking such decisions.  
 
Canada serves as an interesting case example for this type of study. The AHR Act 
Section 8 (Consent) Regulations are silent on length of storage and destruction of 
embryos. Yet, the Regulations are prescriptive regarding donation to third parties, use 
in testing and research, and following the death of a partner.60 Canadian IVF clinics 
operationalize storage and consent for use through annual storage payment contracts. 
In Paper 3, using patient interview data, I document how stored embryos become 
liminal objects that acquire a transformative legal and instrumental status for those 
who agree to cryopreserve and retain them. At the same time, Canadian law 
                                                             
59 Squier (n51) at 17.   
60 Section 8 (Consent) Regulations (n21). 
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transforms the embryo into a human property object over which the couple and the 
IVF clinic exercise obligations and rights. For many, the need to renew annual 
storage contracts provokes a bio-body identity “crisis” triggered by the prospect of 
(in)fertility and prospect of a loss of reproductive control.  
 
My findings reveal that the absence of direct regulation is not an impediment to 
decision-making. Patients understood the consequences of failing to pay storage fees 
and contractual agreement deadlines loomed large, frequently generating confusion 
and doubt. Canadian patients are not faced with legislated renewal timelines as 
occurs in the U.K. But the ‘flexibility’ of the Canadian system comes at a personal 
cost as annual renewal contract schedules can generate tensions especially as couples 
share a decisional obligation in law for the use and disposition of embryos. Sharing 
of decision-making could be problematic and evoked strong views from interviewees, 
especially when members of the couple disagreed.   
 
Many of those interviewed described their journey between fertility and (in)fertility 
to be a voyage occurring outside of a support system of the communitas of infertile 
women. Possession of embryos that one did not wish to use, nor donate to childless 
couples, was a delicate topic especially if one was on a social media chat line with 
persons searching for embryos. Yet, for some patients, the ability to bring embryos 
home transformed the sorrow of (in)fertility, doubt and personal indecision into an 
act of transformation. The act of performing a ceremonial burial facilitated a crossing 
from one state of being to another, a feature observed by Turner.  
  36 
  
My research asks legal scholars to consider law and regulation from the perspective 
of persons who see their lives shaped and reconfigured by the medicalization of 
(in)fertility and the governance structures established to regulate fertility treatments. 
Too often, legal and ethical concerns focus on the moral significance of the embryo, 
including the ethical implications of its destruction.61 Most revealing were the 
findings obtained from women and men who said the destruction of the embryo was 
not the moral challenge: deciding not to donate them to other couples produced the 
greater moral dilemma as embryos have a reproductive purpose. Yet, these patients 
could not envisage another family raising their biological children.   
  
Paper 3 critically examines problems created for patients by imposed deadlines. A 
regulatory vacuum does not relieve patients of decision-making nor the need to 
achieve a liminal transition by means of a ritual activity. My findings reveal how 
decisions made about the stored embryo reframe legal boundaries.  I investigated 
similar constructs when I examine third-party consent and surrogacy. All too often, I 
found that I was exploring and assessing how regulatory regimes create legal liminal 
ambiguity. In particular, I found how misshapen law and regulatory mismanagement 
can generate confusion and harm—the very outcomes that policy, law, and regulation 
aim to avoid.   
 
                                                             
61 See Thomas Douglas and Julian Savulescu ‘Destroying unwanted embryos in research. Talking 
Point on morality and human embryo research’ (2009) 10(4) Science and Society 307 at 307-8.  
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Paper 7 explores another form of legal liminal space.  I argue that it is through this 
interpretive lens that one can critically evaluate the 2012 legislative amendment at 
s.10(2)(c) of the AHR Act and the recent regulatory reform being undertaken by 
Health Canada.62  The AHR Act 2004 does not prescribe surrogacy (traditional or 
gestational) to be a moral evil unless it occurs as a commercialised activity.  Yet, the 
2012 amendment created another type of criminalised surrogate activity: use by a 
traditional (genetic) surrogate of her own unscreened and untested ova in her own 
surrogate pregnancy. Criminalisation is justified on the basis of this practice 
constituting a health evil.63 The real “evil,” I suggest, is not one of health and safety 
but a perceived moral one: use by a surrogate of her own ‘obtained’ ova.  The 
consequence of this twisted notion of a health-based evil is the use of criminal law to 
restrict traditional surrogate autonomy. When surrogacy employs technology 
enabling the removal of ova from the body of the traditional surrogate, the 
frameworks of patient (intended parents), treatment options (surrogacy), and spare 
part provider (traditional surrogate as ova donor) take precedence. The traditional 
surrogate and her obtained ova exist in a marginal zone, where consent to use a 
resultant embryo may become compromised, as occurred in the case of Ms Chonn 
(Paper 2).  
  
Critical to the creation of a liminal legal space are the conflicting definitions of 
‘donor’ that figure in Canadian statute, regulation and professional guidelines. Paper 
                                                             
62 AHR Act (as amended 2012) at s. 10 (2)(c). 
63 AHR Act (as amended 2012) at s. 10 (1). 
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2 unpacks the notion of a ‘donor’ when applied to a traditional surrogate undergoing 
IVF. It exposes a lack of legal precision evident in Canadian assisted reproduction 
legislation, regulation and case law. By tracing possible trajectories evident in the 
web of rules governing consent, gamete testing and screening, and use by a 
traditional surrogate of her own ova, the paper reveals dangerous legal liminal gaps. I 
argue that that overlapping legal status of IVF ova donor and traditional surrogate 
creates gendered harm and ‘bounded objects’ amenable to regulatory control. It is the 
liminal state of being both donor and traditional surrogate that has the potential to 
create harm as can occur when the traditional surrogate is denied the ability to control 
the use of her ‘obtained’ ova. This loss of control occurs when her ex utero ova is 
designated by regulation as a ‘third-party’ gamete, subject to testing and ‘donated’ to 
the intended parents even though it will be used by the surrogate in her own surrogate 
pregnancy. Once pregnant, the surrogate regains autonomy over her reproduction and 
her pregnancy.64  I argue that law and regulation transform the traditional surrogate 
into a third-party reproductive worker who is both a treatment option (carrier) and 
spare part provider.65  
 
Paper 2 makes an important contribution to the legal liminality literature66 by 
revealing the precarious betwixt and between legal positioning of women who 
engage in IVF traditional surrogacy. Canada’s regulatory framework does not 
adequately recognize the dual status of traditional surrogates who can be egg donors 
                                                             
64 R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30; Tremblay v Daigle [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530  
65 Vanessa Gruben, ‘Women as Patients, Not as Spare Parts: Examining the Relationship Between the 
Physician and Women Egg Providers’ (2013) 25:2 Canadian Journal of Woman and the Law. 249. 
66 Laurie (n50). 
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should they decide to undergo ovarian stimulation and IVF embryo transfers.  Using 
a feminist legal lens, my work elaborates on the observation made by Laurie67 that 
regulation and law can provoke rather than resolve a crisis. This is clear when the 
contradictory definition of ‘donor’ in federal and provincial statutes and professional 
guidelines is crucial to our understanding of the genesis of the acquired liminal 
status. The gendered harm results from traditional surrogates being transformed and 
reimagined by law and regulation into a third-party ova donor who poses a ‘health 
and safety’ risk. The legal requirement to screen and test her ex utero ova creates a 
potential loss of autonomy over her obtained ova. In so doing, the ethical principle of 
autonomy that is enshrined in the Act becomes blurred and diluted. 
 
D. 2: Borderless reproduction: the complexity of international surrogacy  
Papers 8 and 9 rest on a legal analysis of law, statute and policy informed by my 
innovative examination of parental registration information for surrogate births. They 
reveal the importance of social science information in understanding the extra-
territorial reach of the fertility business internationally and the implications of its 
mobility for Canadian surrogates and domestic assisted reproduction policy and law. 
This work brings full circle my critical investigation of legislative and regulatory 
gaps and the inconsistencies that render Canada’s reproductive law morally 
incoherent.  
 
                                                             
67 Laurie (n50) at 69.  
  40 
Canada’s AHR Act prohibition on the payment by intended parents of Canadian 
surrogates has no extra-territorial reach.68 This aspect, together with access to a 
publicly funded health care system, right to equal medical treatment regardless of 
gender or marital status, and physical proximity to the U.S. for treatments banned in 
Canada (such as sex selection), makes Canada an attractive reproductive destination 
for non-resident intended parents. Moreover, Canada’s pull factor has increased 
given recent bans imposed by countries such as India, Vietnam and Nepal. Other 
nations such as the U.K. and some U.S. states impose residency requirements which 
impede access to domestic surrogacy services. The paper argues that non-Canadian 
residents should be discouraged, if not banned, from making Canadian-based 
surrogacy arrangements. Drawing on the work of Wertheimer,69 the paper contends 
that non-Canadian resident intended parents have an unfair advantage in that they can 
pay a surrogate without fear of criminal sanctions.  This option is not available to 
Canadian residents. 
  
The paper exposes once again the morally incoherent nature of Canada’s assisted 
reproduction legislation, a situation made ever more problematic by the proposed 
2018/19 regulations on surrogate reimbursement.  As noted in the joint submission 
made in January 2019 to the Health Canada consultation by a group of Canadian 
lawyers, ethicists and political scientists regarding the proposed draft regulations: “it 
is currently unclear how the Act and Reimbursement regulations will apply to 
                                                             
68 Claire Fenton-Glynn, Outsourcing ethical dilemmas: Regulating international surrogacy 
arrangements. (2016) 24(1) Medical Law Review 59. 
69 Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation (Princeton University Press, 1996) Chapter 4: Surrogacy. 
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intended parents, surrogates or donors who live outside of Canada. As Pamela White 
has documented, there are an increasing number of Canadian women who act as 
surrogates for foreign intended parents. While we are not advocating either for or 
against extra-territoriality, given the consequences of violating the Act (a large fine 
or a prison sentence), such clarification is needed.”70   
 
As Paper 9 reveals, other nations have taken a more legally restricted approach. In 
the U.K., for example, the Parental Order process permits review of the reasonable 
expenses provision of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 a process it could be 
argued exerts a measure of oversight over the monies received by U.K. surrogates to 
cover their expenses. Canada, by failing to regulate surrogacy expenses, provides no 
such control mechanism. The uncertainty lived by surrogates regarding expenses 
forces the activity underground and generates the perfect opportunity misuse. No 
extra-territorial reach in law and the option of easy access to U.S. fertility services 
where payment to a Canadian resident surrogate could occur creates loop holes and 
opportunities for malfeasance. This can occur when the Canadian surrogate travels to 
the U.S. to receive the IVF treatment. It is relatively easy for Canadian surrogates to 
cross the border, and many Canadians, not just surrogates, do so to access fertility 
services.71  
 
                                                             
70 Vanessa Gruben et al., Submission to Office of Legislative and Regulatory Modernization Policy, 
Planning and International Affairs Directorate Health Products and Food Branch Health Canada 
January 10, 2019 1-21 at 16.  
71Aaron Levine et al., ‘Assessing the use of assisted reproductive technology in the United States by 
non–United States Residents’ (2017) 108(5) Fertility and Sterility 815. 
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An important contributor to the growth of international surrogacy in Canada has been 
the privileging of “altruistic” surrogacy, as it is a criminal offence to pay a surrogate.  
 
The paper, co-authored with Karen Busby, questions the trope that commercialisation 
is the most exploitative feature of the practice. Given the AHR Act’s emphasis on the 
importance of autonomy and consent, we ask about the ability of surrogates to give 
informed and voluntary consent and to exercise agency in decision-making about 
treatment decisions and lifestyle changes requested by intended parents. We question 
the opportunity of Canadian surrogates to develop ongoing relationships with 
intended parents. When exploitation is understood in this context, the dichotomy 
between paid and unpaid surrogacy becomes a false one, especially when it revolves 
around notions of a ‘fair amount’ and whether the amount exerts a coercive influence 
on surrogate participation. We contend that non-payment and reliance on altruistic 
motivation are also risks, offering an opportunity for exploitation, especially when 
combined with little regulation.  This example yet again underscores the legally 
incoherent position adopted by the AHR Act.  
   
Paper 9 argues that Canada should actively discourage, if not ban, cross-border 
surrogacy. Meeting the needs of non-resident intended parents means that childless 
Canadians are less likely to find a Canadian surrogate. A Canadian residency 
restriction would promote fairer use of scarce health care resources. Restrictions on 
non-Canadian resident intended parents would address the unfair advantage that they 
enjoy if they offer fees payable offshore. Closing Canada to international surrogacy 
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may prompt other nations to reconsider their own legal and policy stance on 
surrogacy; they will be less able to depend on Canada as a safety valve.  
  
Concomitant with the advantage accorded to non-Canadian resident intended parents 
is the disadvantage experienced by Canadian surrogates—the only actors in the 
process unable to receive financial compensation. We argue that commercial 
surrogacy would remedy the unfair position of surrogates. This approach could 
increase the number of women willing to be surrogates and alleviate the current 
shortage; one that has been exacerbated by international demand. 
 
Like my other work, this paper identifies reproductive harms.  It provides a structured 
argument in defence of decriminalising commercial surrogacy. It highlights what 
appear to be contradictory ethical stances embedded in the AHR Act. On the one 
hand, commercialisation is derided for its exploitative potential yet, as this paper 
shows, altruism leaves Canadian surrogates vulnerable to unfair practices. These 
unintended consequences of a changing surrogacy and assisted reproduction 
landscape have implications for lives of surrogates lived in the law and regulation. 
They also highlight the inadequacies of Canada’s AHR Act. 
 
D. 3 Why we don’t know what we don’t know 
 
Underscoring much of my published work advanced for the PhD by publication has 
been the questioning of ‘why we don’t know what we don’t know’ about assisted 
reproduction and, in particular, surrogacy.  As described in the section on 
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Methodology above, I have looked at the question from a data production 
perspective, notably the manner in which assisted reproduction registries and vital 
statistics registries mask surrogate encounters with fertility medicine and parentage. I 
have made strong recommendations for research to be conducted in Canada with 
surrogates.  I have advocated the examination of Canada’s assisted reproduction 
registry.72 I strongly recommend that CARTR Plus be taken over by a public health 
organisation and that it be made to conform to WHO standards. 
 
The genesis of Canada’s lack of knowledge about assisted reproduction practices and 
outcomes stems from the decision made by the SCC of Canada to strike down ss.16-
19 of the AHR Act 2004.  I argue that the ethical principle of beneficence cannot be 
met without there being a registry that is accountable to Canadians, including the 
children conceived as a result of assisted reproduction techniques.  My findings 
regarding the management of ignorance and its continuation due to a lack of 




CANADA’S MISSHAPEN REPRODUCTIVE LAW---MORALLY 
COHERENT AND EVIDENCE BASED?   
 
My published research examines Canada’s reproductive law to reveal a legislative 
framework that is neither morally coherent nor evidence-based. Empirical and 
                                                             
72 A major SSHRC grant has been awarded for the qualitative and quantitative research on surrogacy 
in Canada. I am a co-applicant in this four year grant (2019-2023).  
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statistical investigations of fertility clinics’ compliance with soft regulations 
established by medical bodies reveal deficiencies that are potentially harmful to 
surrogate mothers and their offspring and which generate regulatory gaps for those 
who store eggs and embryos. The recasting of traditional surrogacy when undertaken 
via IVF as a health evil fails to meet the test set by the SCC in Ref re AHR. My 
findings shed light on the nuanced boundaries of vulnerability experienced by 
fertility patients and surrogates. These analyses demonstrate the value of 
investigating by means of empirical and statistical research how lives are shaped by 
law.  These approaches enable a critical examination of liminal regulatory spaces 
including the analysis of vulnerabilities and gendered harms.   
  
In my work, I ask legal scholars to question how information and knowledge about 
surrogacy practices and outcomes are obtained, managed and used in law and policy-
making. My findings uncover the normative shaping of the concept of ‘patient’ by 
embryological science and fertility medicine. I demonstrate how the focus on the 
embryo and the infertile patient concentrates the scientific and clinical gaze on the 
intended parents rather than the surrogate who undergoes the pregnancy and delivery 
on their behalf. I argue for greater attention regarding how scientific knowledge is 
generated73 and used in the service of the law. My submitted work reveals that 
existing information about assisted reproduction is insufficient for law- and policy-
making, especially given rapid changes in fertility medicine and the growing demand 
                                                             
73 See David S. Caudill, Chapter 8 Conclusion: A New Picture of Science in Law’ in Stories about 
Science in Law: Literary and Historical Images of Acquired Expertise. (2011) Farnham: Ashgate 
Publishing 137. 
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for surrogacy services by those in Canada and abroad. These studies indicate the need 
for more research on the outcomes of fertility medicine for all patients and give 
scholarly weight to empirically based explorations of experiences of patients (gamete 
donors and surrogates).  
 
As for the future of Canada’s misguided and morally incoherent AHR Act, the 
proposed 2018 draft AHR regulations have the potential to exacerbate, rather than to 
mitigate, this incoherence.74  The proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova regulations 
perpetuate the existing gendered harms that the Act produces by blurring the 
definition of donor.75 There remains a lack of clarity regarding the ability of the 
traditional surrogate to exercise control over the use of her ‘obtained’ ova.  The 
proposed 2018 draft Regulations also fail to address the need for evidence-based 
decision-making, though it must be admitted that without provincial cooperation on 
this front there is little the federal government can do to remedy this vexing situation. 
This is where the crux of the matter lies. Unless the federal government steps forward 
to initiate a provincial/federal dialogue aimed at seeking cooperation and 
harmonisation, little can be expected to change.  
 
Canada’s AHR Act 2004 (amended 2012) relies on criminal law.  Its restricted scope 
post Ref re AHR gives it limited regulatory scope. The Act’s approach is punitive and 
its remit is narrowly focused on a few prohibited activities over which the federal 
government can exercise criminal code authority, such as commercial gamete 
                                                             
74 Canada Gazette Part 1 (n3).     
75 Canada Gazette Part 1 (n3).  See Paper 2 for a fulsome discussion of this item 
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donation and surrogacy, and use of unscreened sperm and ova. It lacks legislative 
ability to adapt to changing social conditions and situations.  As a result, the statute 
as currently drafted cannot address emerging issues such as mitochondrial DNA 
transfers and genome alteration (CRISPR-CAS9) or the growing demand for 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis.76  
 
It is regrettable that there appears to exist so little opportunity for a revamping of the 
Act. If this were to occur, my work suggests that a return to consideration of the 
ethical principles that function as a foundation to the legislation would be a good 
point of departure.  Currently these principles exist merely as an unenforceable 
statement of good intentions.  Canada would have a national donor registry had the 
SCC established that the beneficence principle had constitutional legislative 
purchase.  As well, data on treatments and outcomes could have been collected in a 
transparent manner with findings and research analysis being used to develop law 
and policy. With legislative change, there would be an opportunity to entertain a 
discussion on federal decriminalisation of commercial surrogacy and gamete 
donation. I argue that there are ways to compensate surrogates and donors for their 
services without creating an international market in babies and bodies.  These are the 
challenges facing reproductive law and policy in Canada.  
 
 
                                                             
76 The AHR Act is silent on PGD. No province has regulated it.  
